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FACED wm UNNECESSARY ADVERSITY,
ISRAEL STRIKES THE PROPER BALANCE

BETWEEN SECURITY AND HUMANUrY
I. INTRODUCTION

[T]he Arab states, where dictatorial regimes use every means
at their disposal to silence and crush all potential and actual
dissent . . . lack the most basic elements of human
rights-freedom of speech, freedom of the press, free elections,
equality for women, freedom of religion, freedom of association-and opponents, instead of facing television cameras, face
execution. These countries do not have to defend themselves
against self-declared foes who continue to aim for their demise.
Yet, these nations do not draw the enormous degree of attention
that Israel receives for measures taken in defense of its security
needs and in accordance with international law.'
Israel is a young country surrounded by her most hostile enemies.
Political analysts, legal scholars, and lay persons, with their Western
ideology, have condemned Israel for not going back to her pre-1967
borders. They claim Israel should accept the lines drawn by Security
Council Resolution 282, which cuts Jerusalem 2 through the middle, leaving
a distance of only nine miles between the new Arab border and the
Mediterranean Sea.' Nine miles is the equivalent of one lap and a half
around Manhattan's Central Park. 4 Clearly, no country, let alone one with
Israel's past, should accept this division as a solution to the Palestinian
refugee problem. Since Israel might be signing her own death warrant by
giving up so much of her precious land in return for only a promise of
peace, she is forced into a position where she must control the territory's
hostile inhabitants.
1. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ISRAEL'S MEASURES IN THE TERRrrORIES AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 40 (1990) [hereinafter ISRAEL'S MEASURES].
2. Jews have always lived in the ancient capital of Israel. It is a matter of fact that
"Jews have constituted the largest single group of inhabitants since 1844." NEAR EAST
REPORT, MYTHS AND FACTS 1976, A CONCISE RECORD OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

97 (1976) [hereinafter ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT].
3. A Land to Share, ECONOMIST, Oct. 26, 1991, at 13.
4. Id.
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Recently, there have been great strides taken to bring about a
compromise between the Israelis and Palestinians-a compromise that
would appear to bring about a promise of peace. Israel would exchange
the Gaza Strip and Jericho for such a promise. However, at this time
these agreements are but broad strokes. The ultimate goals set forth
between the parties are devoid of any detail. Moreover, there are those
factions on both sides that oppose the compromise. And, unfortunately,
this leaves Israel in a precarious position. She must negotiate with the
Palestinians to cement her ultimate goal of peace while enforcing
unpopular methods of security such as administrative detention.
These same legal scholars and political analysts who believe Israel
should give up land for peace also criticize Israel for her use of security
measures and more specifically, administrative detention. The purpose of
this Note is to illustrate that the need for administrative detention is not
only justified by international legal principles and carried out properly
under local law, but is imperative for the very existence of the State of
Israel.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE AND
THE STATE OF ISRAEL

In A.D. 70, the Roman armies under Titus suppressed a Hebrew revolt
for independence in the land of Palestine, expelling most of the people
from their homeland. 5 Between A.D. 70 and A.D. 135, the Romans
conquered the entire nation of Palestine, slaughtering as many as six
hundred thousand Jews. 6 The survivors were heavily taxed and denied
entry into Jerusalem. Eventually they made their home in Galilee. 7 These
Jews cultivated the land, applied their trades, and revived a dying
community. 8 The revival ended swiftly with the advent of the crusaders. 9
The butchering of Jews was so devastating that only one thousand families
survived. "
Subsequently, Jewish immigrants began to arrive from all over the
5. IRVIG L. GORDON, WORLD HISTORY 16 (2d ed. 1980).
6. HOWARD M. SACHAR, A HISTORY OF ISRAEL FROM THE RISE
Tam 18 (1979).
7. Id.at 18.

8. Id.
9. Id.at 19.
10. Id.

OF ZIONISM TO OUR
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world." As a result of the Spanish Inquisition and the Spanish Expulsion
in 1492, thousands of Sephardim migrated into Palestine.' 2 This migration
coincided with the Ottoman conquest." Under Ottoman rule, the Palestine
of the early 1800s was in utter disarray.1 4 Turkish indifference and
misgovernment stimulated recurrent warfare between local towns and
permitted bands of robbers to terrorize the country's four hundred
thousand inhabitants.' s In the early 1800s, within the confines of the four
holy cities in Palestine, only five to six thousand Jews survived.' 67
However, immigration from Russia and eastern Europe began in earnest.'
These new immigrants began implementing the philosophy of Zionism,
which was dedicated to rebuilding a national Jewish home after thousands
of years of frustration, torture, and oppression."
During the 1880s, Jewish settlements began to rise' 9 at the same time
that Arab nationalism began to flourish.2" Syrian, Lebanese, and
Palestinian Arabs desired liberation from Ottoman rule. 2' The Jewish
dream for a national state and the Arab desire for liberation from Ottoman
rule sparked extreme friction between the two cultures. 22
At the close of World War I, Britain suppressed the Turks and
conquered Palestine.23 It was at this time, in 1917, that Britain offered her
support to the Zionist movement through the Balfour Declaration24 to assist
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
(1989)
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 22.
Id.
Id.at 23.
See id. at 36-64.
Id.
Id.at 26.
Nomi Bar-Yaacov, Human Rights in the West Bank and Gaza Strip 1948-1989 3
(unpublished B.A dissertation, Faculty of Law, Cambridge University).
Id.at 3.
Id.
Id.
I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His
Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with
Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by the Cabinet.
His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment
in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use
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in the establishment of a "National Home for the Jewish People"' in
Palestine. Britain, however, also promised to safeguard "the civil and
religious rights"26 of the existing Arab inhabitants. 27 The contradiction
between Britain's dual commitment to Jewish and Arab nationalism soon
led to riots and massacres in Jewish towns at the hands of the Arab
people.2" These riots were a direct result of the Arabs' fear that Jews
were making a home for themselves, in the place where Judaism was
born.29 In 1922, Britain partitioned eighty percent of what was the historic
land of Palestine and gave it to the Arabs. This land later became known
as Transjordan.3° In 1937, with a multi-front world war on the horizon,
Britain proposed to partition the remaining twenty percent in order to quell
the overwhelming animosity in the Middle East.3" The Partition Plan, as
it was named, created two states, one Jewish and the other Arab, with
Jerusalem remaining in British hands.32 The Jewish people were divided
in their response while the Arabs were opposed." The Arabs desired the
remaining twenty percent. It was apparent that to designate a total of
ninety percent of the land as Arab soil would still be unacceptable to the
Arabs. Britain, having no success in resolving the differences between the
two cultures, passed the problematic area over to the United Nations. 34
On November 29, 1947, four years after six million Jews were
exterminated by the Nazis, the United Nations adopted Resolution 181." 5
their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it
being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may
prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish

communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed
by Jews in any other country.
I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the
knowledge of the Zionist Federation.
Id.at 41 (Letter from A.W. James Balfour to Lord Rothschild (Nov. 2, 1917) (The Balfour
Declaration)).
25. Id.at 3.

26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.at 4.
30. ARAB-ISRAELI CoNFLICr, supra note 2, at 2.
31. Bar-Yaacov, supra note 20, at 5.

32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.at 4.

35. Id.at 5.
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This resolution suggested the partitioning of Palestine into three parts: a
Jewish state, 36 an Arab state," and a UN administered international zone
for the cities of Jerusalem and Bethlehem. 39 This time the Jews accepted
the partition and once again the Arabs rejected it.' Moreover, the very
next day the Arabs, without provocation, attacked the Jewish communities
in defiance of the UN Resolution.41
Between December 1947 and May 1948, guerilla warfare raged
between the two communities. 42 Despite their numerical superiority, the
Palestinian Arabs were soundly defeated by the Jewish people.43 During
April and May, the Israeli defense force, better known as the Hagana,
switched to the offensive. This change in strategy was driven by a sense
of possible defeat as a result of imminent British withdrawal and the
expected invasion of Palestine by Transjordan, Lebanon, Egypt, and
By May 14, 1948, the Jewish people proved their military
Iraq.'
superiority and the Palestinians were driven back in defeat. It was on this
day that the Jewish leaders declared the establishment of the State of
Israel.45 On May 15, 1948, the United States recognized the new Jewish
state46 and Israel extended her hand of friendship to her neighbors." 7 On

that same day, those neighbors, Transjordan, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and
Iraq declared war and invaded the new nation from every border.4" As the
Egyptian and Jordanian armies invaded Israel, they also took control of the
land that was to become the new Palestinian state. 49 The Gaza Strip was
seized by Egypt and the land on the West Bank of the Jordan River was
36. The territory between the West Bank (also known as Judea and Samaria) and the
Mediterranean Sea would be given to the Jewish people. Id.
37. The West Bank and Gaza would remain in Palestinian hands. Id.
38. Monica Borkowski, Israelis and Arabs: The 44 Years of Rage and Hate, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 30, 1991, at All.
39. Bar-Yaacov, supra note 20, at 5.

40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. GoRDoN, supra note 5, at 385.

44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Bar-Yaacov, supra note 20, at 6.
47. ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, supra note 2, at 2.
48. Bar-Yaacov, supra note 20, at 6.
49. ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, supra note 2, at 2.
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seized by Jordan.5" Thus, Palestine was seized by Jordan and Egypt, not
Israel.5" When the Israeli war for Independence ended, Israel claimed
only those areas allotted to her by the partition plan and the necessary
adjustments caused by the battles of the war. 2 These areas comprise the
only land that Israel held for almost twenty years.53
In May 1967, Egyptian forces rolled into the Sinai and Cairo Radio's
Voice of the Arabs proclaimed: "All Egypt is now prepared to plunge into
total war which will put an end to Israel."' Later that month the Voice
of the Arabs announced: "The sole method we shall apply against Israel5
is a total war which will result in the extermination of Zionist existence. "1
Defense Minister Hafez56 Assad, now Syria's president, enthusiastically
agreed when he stated:
Our forces are now entirely ready not only to repulse the
aggression, but to initiate the act of liberation itself, and to
explode the Zionist presence in the Arab homeland. The Syrian
Army, with its finger on the trigger, is united . . . I, as a

military man, believe that the time has come to enter into the
battle of liberation.57
50. GORDON, supra note 5, at 385.
51. Id.

52. Id.
53. Id.

54. ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, supra note 2, at 30.
55. Id.
56. Id.

57. Id.
Extreme Arab rhetoric invariably begins by claiming that Israel has no
right to exist as a sovereign Jewish state. Israel, in fact, has a well-known
historic background, as impressive as any other nation state. Its international
'birth certificate' was validated by: the ancient promise of the Bible; the
British Balfour Declaration in 1917; the League of Nations Mandate, which
incorporated the Balfour Declaration; the UN partition resolution in 1947;
Israel's admission to the UN in 1949; the recognition of Israel by most other
states; and the society created by Israel's people in [43] years of thriving,
dynamic national existence.
The Jewish people have maintained ties to their historic homeland for
more than 3000 years. During this period, a national language and a distinct
civilization have been maintained. Settlement in Israel has continued through
the centuries, and 70 years of nation-building, beginning in 1878, produced a
Jewish state that the UN at last officially recognized in 1948.
Id. at 7.
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Israel had no choice but to launch an offensive maneuver to save
herself from extinction.58 It was during this six day war that Israel gained
control of what is now referred to as the occupied territories.59 These
territories are home to those Palestinians who fled Israel and Jordan during
the wars of 1948 and 1967.'
III. THE ARAB MANUFACTURING OF THE
PALESTINIAN REFUGEES
The accusations that the Palestinians do not have a homeland are false
and misleading.
[There are those who believe] there already exists a Palestinian
state-and its name is Jordan . . . [t]here are approximately
700,000 Palestinians in Jordan out of a total population of
1,300,000. Today: Many of Jordan's cabinet ministers and
members of parliament came from western Palestine. The major

part of the country's economy and the government administration
is in the hands of former residents of western Palestine.
Approximately three-quarters of the inhabitants of Amman, the
capital, came from western Palestine. These facts and figures
58. Id. at 29.
The Israelis seized (1) from Egypt-the Gaza Strip and the entire
59.
Sinai Peninsula westward to the Suez Canal and southward to the
Sharm el Sheikh, opening the Gulf of Aqaba [to Israel] . . . (2)

from Jordan-allterritory on the West Bank of the Jordan River,
including the Old City of Jerusalem; and (3)from Syria-theGolan
Heights.
GORDON, supra note 5, at 386.
The number of Palestinian refugees has always been vastly
60.
inflated by Arab propagandists.
Arabs who had lived in the area of Israel defined by the 1949
armistice agreements numbered about 750,000.
About 160,000 Arabs remained in Israel after the exodus.
This means that the total number of bona fide Arab refugees who
left Israel was about 590,000. Of these, 20 percent soon found
permanent homes and resettlement in the Arab world, according to
early [United Nations Relief and Workers Agency] reports ....
When the fighting ended, many Arabs living in the territory seized
by Jordan claimed that they were entitled to relief because they had
been rendered indigent by the war. Many who had never lived in
Israel were now given the status of refugees.
ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, supra note 2, at 60.
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of Jordan is, for all intents
mean that the Hashemite Kingdom
61
State.
Palestinian
a
purposes,
and
Setting this unpopular sentiment aside, if the Arabs had accepted the
1947 UN resolution, there would not be a single Arab refugee. If the
Arabs did not go to war against Israel, every Palestinian Arab would be
living at peace in an independent Arab state. Additionally, the Arab
nations also refused to assimilate these refugees into their own societies. 62
The obvious truth is that Arab leaders were the stimuli behind the Arab
departure thereby instigating a holy war against the Jews.63 Yet the
leaders of the Arab community consistently try to disavow responsibility
for Arab flight."
On October 2, 1948, The London Economist carried a British
eyewitness account:
Various factors influenced [the Arabs'] decision to seek safety in
flight. There is but little doubt that the most potent of the factors
were the announcements made over the air by the Arab Higher
Executive, urging all Arabs ... to quit. The reason given was

that upon the final withdrawal of the British, the combined
armies of the Arab states would invade Palestine and 'drive the
Jews into the sea,' and it was clearly intimated that those Arabs
who remained . . . and accepted Jewish protection would be

regarded as renegades.65

The United Nations Economic Survey Mission and the United Nations
Relief and Workers Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East
("UNRWA") report the number of Palestinian Arabs who became refugees
during and as a result of the 1948 war at 726,000.66 British post-1948
assessments place the number of Arabs who left between 530,000 and
590,000.67 Arab representatives, predictably, place the number of
refugees up near one million. 68 These Palestinian refugees fled mainly to
61. Id. at 68-69.
62. GORDON, supra note 5, at 381.
63. ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, supra note 2, at 54.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 55.

66. ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, supra note 2, at 2.
67. Id.
68. Bar-Yaacov, supra note 20, at 6.
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Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Egypt.69 Instead of offering opportunities to
the Arab refugees, most Arab governments refused to integrate their
displaced brethren. 7° These governments insisted that the refugees live in
separate camps and preferred to shift the burden of caring for these Arabs
to the world community. 71 This attitude was best summed up by the
former head of UNRWA in Jordan when he said: "The Arab states do not
want to solve the refugee problem. They want to keep it an open sore, as
Arab
an affront to the United Nations and as a weapon against Israel.
72
leaders don't give a damn whether the refugees live or die."
It is important to note that the exodus of Jews from Arab lands has
been even larger than the flight of Arabs from Israel.73 In 1948, over
840,000 Jews lived in the outlying Arab countries. 74 By 1973, over
800,000 Jews left75 and 600,000 of them had resettled in Israel. 76 Across
the world, over the last forty years, millions of people have resettled on
foreign soil because of political, ethnic, or religious pressures.77 The
69. Id.
The claim that Jewish terrorism drove out Palestinians is contradicted by the
facts. In 1948 Arab attacks upon Jewish civilians were the rule. By contrast,
Jewish defense groups focused primarily upon military targets. Moreover,
recently released documents from the U.S. Archives contain many 1948
dispatches from American Consul Aubrey Lippencott in Haifa, repeatedly
insisting that the Jews were urging Arabs to remain.
ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT,

supra note 2, at 2-3.

70. Bar-Yaacov, supra note 20, at 7.
71. ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, supra note 2, at 53.

72. Bar-Yaacov, supra note 20, at 7.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, supra note 2, at 2. In effect, there was a population
exchange. Israel absorbed a greater number of Jews from the Arab nations and did so
without the land, resources, or oil reserves of the Arab states. Id. at 3.
77. Bar-Yaacov, supra note 20, at 7 n.4.
Following the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947, at
least four million Moslems moved from India to Pakistan and the
same number of Hindus were reported to have moved from Pakistan
to India. In Europe, by September 1950 three million Sudeten
Germans had been expelled from Czechoslovakia and later settled
in West Germany, East Germany or Austria. Between 1949 and the
building of the Berlin Wall in 1961, more than three and a half
million refugees fled from East Germany. In Africa, the largest
movement of permanent refugees was clearly the return to Eastern
Nigeria shortly before the civil war of the Ibos. Following the
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distinguishing factor between the Arab refugees and those millions is that
every one of those non-Arab countries that received a flood of refugees,
tried their best to accommodate the new arrivals.78
The Arab countries have done their best to prevent the resettlement
of the Palestinian-Arab refugees.79 Politically, this tactic has been a great
success." Israel has been forced to provide unpopular security measures
within her borders and the Arabs have created global awareness of the
sufferings of the Palestinian people. These sufferings are perceived to be
at the hands of the Jewish people of Israel.81
The sufferings to which the Arabs refer are detention centers and
prisons for detainees, demolition of homes, monetary fines, deportations,
so-called riots, and beatings.82 They make the valid complaint that the
Israeli security forces are often rash and aggressive.8 3 Moreover, they
complain about the various means of oppression, ranging from the
breaking of limbs to the use of rubber bullets and live ammunition used
to quell Palestinian protests. 8 However, what the Arabs do not address
are the reasons for these security measures: the senseless massacres of
innocent Israelis, terrorist activities waged against Israel, and their own
committed belief that the State of Israel does not, and should not exist.
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION AS A NECESSARY SECURITY
MEASURE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

Administrative detention, commonly called preventive detention or
85
governmental
by the
security
of thesafety.
is onepublic
8 6 Themeasures
internment,
internment
calls for
measure used
authorities to ensure

Vietnamese partition in 1956, more than one million South
Vietnamese moved to temporary refugee camps.
Id. at 7.
78. Id.
79. Id.

80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Yasir Arafat, Address at the U.N. Security Council Session in Geneva (May 28,
1990) [hereinafter Arafat's Address].

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Emma Playfair, Administrative Detention in the Israeli-Occupied West Bank, 42
INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS REV. 31 (1985).
86. Bar-Yaacov, supra note 20, at 35.
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of individuals who are perceived to be hostile terrorists or otherwise
involved in illegal activity, without charge or trial, using administrative
legal procedures. 7 The military authorities are charged with the
responsibility of detaining these hostile individuals. 8
It is not surprising that detention without trial gives rise to criticism.
However, the need for administrative detention was recognized by all
states who signed the Geneva Convention.89 Furthermore, it is a widely
accepted security measure "which has been adopted and recognized by the
jurisprudence of many countries, including the United States, Canada and
Great Britain. "" The International Commission of Jurists reported that at
least eighty-five countries had enacted legislation allowing internment in
the early 1980s and have implemented it within the last three or four
years.91

Not only is administrative detention in full accord with both the
Hague Regulations and Geneva Convention, it also follows the emergency
regulations issued during the period of the British Mandate. 92 All
detainees have the right to appeal their detainment as high up as the
Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice. 93 If the determination
is that the individual was detained without sufficient basis, the detainee
must be released.'
When deciding whether or not a military commander has a sufficient
basis to place a suspect under administrative detention, the following
principles apply:
A. Administrative detention is to be used only in those cases
87. Id. at 35-36; ISRAEL'S MEASURES, supra note 1, at 16; Playfair, supra note 85,
at 31.
88. Playfair, supra note 85, at 31.
89. Bar-Yaacov, supra note 20, at 35.
90. INFORMATION DEPARTMENT, CONSULATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL IN NEW YORK,
POLICY BACKGROUND: ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION IN JUDEA, SAMARIA AND GAZA 1
[hereinafter ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION].

91. Jordan Paust et al., Report of the ICI Mission of Inquiry into the Israeli Military
Court System in the Occupied West Bank and Gaza, 14 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REv. 1, 52 (1990); Niall MacDermot (Security-General of the International Commission
of Jurists), Intervention on Administrative Detention to the UN Commission on Human
Rights, ICJ NEWSLETTER No. 24, Jan./Mar. 1985, at 53, cited in Playfair, supra note 85,
at 33.
92. ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION, supra note 90, at 1.

93. Id.
94. Id.
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where information against an individual cannot be revealed in
court and where the protection of witnesses and sensitive sources
of information is the reason for not putting the individual on
trial.
B. An individual cannot be placed under administrative detention
for his or her views or for political acts, but only for hostile and
illegal activity.
C. The information serving as the basis for the detention must
show continuous and ongoing activity, and must support a wellfounded suspicion that the individual will continue to engage in
such activity were it not for his being placed under detention.
D. The information serving as the basis for the detention must
be verified and reliable, in order to preclude the possibility that
individuals might be detained on the basis of groundless
accusations. Therefore, all care is taken to ensure that the
information is based on more than one source and, when
possible, several sources. 95
It is extremely important to note that administrative detention is not
a punishment, but rather a security measure by which an occupying power
prevents persons who are thought to be dangerous from eventually
committing acts dangerous to state security. 96 "No one is arrested because
of his political views. The reason for arrest is always the existence of
proof of participation in, or abetting, terrorist activities, incitement to such
activities or spying." 97
V. ISRAELI IMPLEMENTATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION

UNDER THE RUBRIC OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
The framers of the 1907 Hague Convention IV and 1949 Geneva
95. Id.
96. Cheryl V. Reicin, Preventive Detention, Curfews, Demolition of Houses, and
Deportations:An Analysis ofMeasuresEmployed by Israel in the Administered Territories,
8 CARDozo L. REV. 515, 525 n.52 (1985) ("While the normal procedural requirements
of trial are not provided, persons placed under the preventive detention are accorded a
right of appeal. Geneva Convention IV art. 78. If the appeal is denied, the decision must
be reviewed periodically, if possible every six months.").
97. Bar-Yaacov, supra note 20, at 36.
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Convention IV envisioned the need for administrative detention at a time
when a state temporarily occupied the sovereign territory of an enemy
state.9" They assumed that a war would end one way or another and the
occupied territory would be either annexed or returned to the original
sovereign. 9 Although Israel has never accepted this characterization of
its occupation of the West Bank, she still applies its humanitarian
principles. 10
The circumstances in the West Bank are notably distinguishable from
traditional belligerent occupation. First, it is not clear whether the
occupied territories were part of the sovereign territory of Jordan,' from
whom Israel took land in a war of self-defense in 19 6 7 .1' Second, the
traditional customary law and the convention laws of Geneva and the
Hague looked upon belligerent occupation as temporary, pending the
prompt conclusion of war and negotiation of peace."0 3 This is obviously
not the case in this situation. Israel, meanwhile, denying the strict
applicability of the 1907 Hague Regulations and the 1947 Geneva
the treaties'
Convention, which discussed administrative detention, applied
°4
humanitarian principles as guidelines to her occupation.1
Critics often challenge Israel on the legality of its use of
administrative detention procedures under international law. However,
Article 43 of the Hague Regulations obligates the controlling authority to
"take all the measures in its power to restore and ensure, as far as
possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely
prevented, the laws in force in the country."'0° Article 78 of the fourth
98. William V. O'Brien, Israel, The West Bank and InternationalLaw,

WASH. STAR,

Nov. 26, 1978, at 1.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. "It is the Israeli position that the Territories belonged to no one, therefore Israel

is not an occupier." Carol Bisharat, Palestineand HumanitarianLaw: Israel Practicein
the West Bank and Gaza, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 325, 337 (1989). A
countervailing argument suggests that Israel misconstrues the Fourth Geneva Convention
and it discounts the legitimate rights of the Palestinians as civilians. It is suggested that
Israel's argument is framed in terms of an Israeli-Jordanian, Israeli-Egyptian conflict

which ignores the independent rights of the Palestinians. Id.
102. O'Brien, supra note 98, at 1. "The West Bank is an integral part of the Palestine
Mandate within which a Jewish National Home was to be created. In a sense the territory
must be considered today to be unallocated territory." Id.

103. Id.
104. Id.
105. ISRAEL'S MEASURES, supra note 1, at 6.
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Geneva Convention states: "If the occupying power considers it necessary
for imperative reasons of security, to take safety measures concerning
protected persons, it may

. . .

subject them to

. .

.internment."106

"The emphasis on the need for imperative reasons of security was
affirmed by President Shamgar of the High Court of Justice when he held
in Ibrahim Al Hamid Sejira v. The Ministerof Defence, that administrative
detention was 'a . ..step which the law permits under circumstances in

which it is absolutely necessary because of definite security reasons. "1°7
Article 27 of the fourth Geneva Convention also provides support for
detention when individuals are deemed
Israel's right to use administrative
08
1
security.
her
to
risks
Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to
respect for their persons, their honour, their family rights, their
religious convictions and practices, and their manners and
customs. They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall
be protected especially against all acts of violence or threats
thereof and against insults and public curiosity.
However, the parties to the conflict may take such measures
of control and security in regard to protected persons as may be
necessary as a result of the war.'O°

In an effort to create some criteria by which preventive detention
should be administered, one commentary to the fourth Geneva Convention
asserted that, "[i]n occupied territories the internment of protected persons
should be even more exceptional than it is inside the territory of the
can only be ordered for real and
Parties to the conflict.., such measures
110
imperative reasons of security."
106. Geneva Convention IV art. 78., para.1 (emphasis added).

The Official

Commentary to the Geneva Convention IV provides:
Unlike the Articles which come before it, Article 78 relates to
people who have not been guilty of any infringement of the penal
provisions enacted by the Occupying Power, but that Power may,
for reasons of its own, consider them dangerous to its security and
is consequently entitled to restrict their freedom of action.
Reicin, supra note 96, at 525.
107. Paust et al. supra note 91, at 52.
108. Reicin, supra note 96, at 523.
109. Id.
110. Playfair, supra note 85, at 33 (emphasis added).
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As early as 1962, the International Commission of Jurists, at a
conference in Bangkok, proposed certain prerequisites for the use of
administrative detention."' The commission stated that administrative
detention "should be lawful only during a period of public emergency
threatening the life of the nation. "112
These preceding commentaries necessarily raise the following
questions: What is a public emergency threatening the life of a nation
which would justify the use of administrative detention? What are real and
imperative reasons of state security? While answering these questions, we
must remind ourselves that many Arabs believe that the very existence of
Israel is a gross injustice and given the opportunity, the Arab nations
would gladly "slit Israel's throat."" 3
The clearest examples of this conviction are the SCUD missile attacks
launched against the State of Israel during the Persian Gulf War." 4 Iraq,
by firing indiscriminately into heavily populated areas in Israel, blatantly
violated the fundamental tenets of the laws of war."1 5 The missile attacks,
aside from disrupting everyday life in Israel (i.e., school closings, Israelis
staying home from work, and residents of the Tel-Aviv area fleeing in
droves to other parts
of the country) killed, wounded, and terrorized
6
innocent civilians. "
The Arabs would have the world community believe that Israel
misuses the concept of "security" to justify virtually anything. They
believe that "security" has become an arbitrary term, broad enough to
rationalize almost anything, including censorship, freedom of association,
freedom of movement, and even academic freedom.
One must consider, however, that there are six countries considered
to be sponsors of international terrorism; 7 four of these six countries,
Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria, surround the State of Israel." 8 Additionally,
those same four countries are committed to the destruction of the country
111. Id.
112. Id. (emphasis added).
113. A Land to Share, supra note 3, at 13.
114. Middle East Watch Committee of Human Rights Watch, Under the Toughest
Curfew Since 1973, West Bank and Gaza Palestinians Face Growing Hardship 1 (Jan. 27,
1991) (available from Middle East Watch).

115. Id.
116. Id.
117. INFORMATION

DEPARTMENT CONSULATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL IN NEW YORK,

SUMMARY--PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 1991 MIDDLE EASTERN

118. Id.

Sect. 1.
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by any means necessary." 9 The United States Department of State's
annual study of international terrorism reported that Syrian President
Assad had publicly defended Palestinian attacks in Israel and the
territories. 12
The Palestinians who choose to participate in subversive acts have
resorted to a variety of weaponry: rocks, concrete blocks, iron bars, slingshots, zip-guns, nail-studded potatoes, knives, hatchets, molotov cocktails,
and firearms.' 21 While some would dismiss these weapons as mere toys
in comparison to the Israeli military arsenal, on February 24, 1989, a
young paratrooper was struck dead by a thirty-three pound concrete block
which was hurled at his patrol from atop a four-story building."
Moreover, 1,836 molotov cocktails were thrown at civilians and soldiers
123
in a twenty month period, maiming, disfiguring, and killing the victims.
These continuous threats and acts of violence are by no means limited
toward the Jewish people of Israel. 24 The Palestinians coerce and threaten
each other in order to promote confrontation. 125 Palestinian Liberation
Organization ("PLO") 26 operatives have threatened local shopkeepers so
that they close their businesses. 27 They forcibly prevent Arab workers
from commuting to their jobs in Israel by rendering their vehicles
inoperative. 21 Some Palestinians have even resorted to attacking public
transportation by burning buses. 129 Local youths are coerced into rioting,
blocking roads with burning tires, and throwing rocks. 3 '
The ultimate form of pressure, however, has been physical assaults
on individuals and their families.' 3' Since the Intifada 3 2 began, over 500
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. ISRAEL'S MEASURES, supra note 1, at 3.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 4.
125. Id.
126. "The PLO is a loose confederation of terrorist organizations unified mainly by
a desire to destroy Israel." ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT, supra note 2, at 3.
127. ISRAEL'S MEASURES, supra note 1, at 4.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 5.
132. An uprising or mass rebellion and protest by the Palestinians against the military
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Bisharat, supra note 101, at 370.

1993]

ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION

Palestinians were tortured and murdered by fellow Palestinians.13 Yassar
Arafat, the leader of the PLO, condoned the acts of violence when he
warned the mayor of Bethlehem, "[w]hoever thinks of stopping the
intifada 34before it achieves its goal, I will give him ten bullets in the
1
chest."
Those who oppose administrative detention claim "imprisonment
without charge or trial constitutes a serious infringement of the
13 5
individual's rights to protection from arbitrary arrest and due process."
They cite Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
("UDHR") and Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights ("ICCPR") for the proposition that "[n]o one shall be
subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. "136
With respect to the right to due process, the opposition cites Article
10 of the UDHR: "Every one is entitled in full equality to a fair and
public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the
determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge
against him. "137 Under the spirit of these articles, administrative detention
as laid out in Military Order 378 (as amended) would seem to carelessly
and indiscriminately violate an individuals right to due process. 38
However, this argument does not take into account the fourth Geneva
Convention (1949) which, as discussed previously, permits the occupying
power to use internment "forimperative reasons of security. "139
Clearly, with such overwhelmingly vicious sentiment in the
Palestinian community, international law must permit Israel to maintain
order and public safety in the territories for the benefit of Arabs and Jews
alike.1 40 It is obvious that real and imperative reasons for state security
133. David Binder & Barbara Crossette, As Ethnic Wars Multiply US Struggles to Meet
the Challenge, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 7, 1993, at C14.
134. ISRAEL'S MEASURES, supra note 1, at 5 (citing the U.S. State Department
Spokesman informing reporters at the daily briefing that the U.S. has a tape recording of
Arafat's threat on January 19).
135. AL-HAQ, LAW IN SERVICE OF MAN, THE WEST BANK AFFILIATE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, PUNISHING A NATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS DURING THE PALESTINIAN UPRISING 217 (Dec. 1989).

136. Id.
137. Id. at 217-18.
138. Id.
139. Id. (emphasis added).
140. ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION, supra note 90, at 1.
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exist. So, in an effort to create the proper balance between security and
humanitarian requirements, Israel employs local laws which are in full
accordance with international
law and the humanitarian provisions of the
141
Convention.
Geneva
VI. ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION AS IMPLEMENTED BY
ISRAELI LAW

Israeli administrative detention procedures are based on the British
Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945142 (Articles 108 and 111).

These British rules were applied during the 1967 war. 143 In April 1970
they were replaced by Article 84(A) and Article 87 of Military Order
378,' " and once again amended by Military Orders 815 and 876 of
1980.145
These amendments established the criteria on which

administrative detention orders could be made, restricted the 46
delegation
of powers, and introduced new judicial review procedures. 1
A.

Restriction of Powers Regarding the Issuance of the
Administrative Detention Order

The amendments, introduced in 1980 by Military Order 815,
restricted the powers given to the area commander of the Israeli
military when issuing an administrative detention order." 47 The area
commander, by the amended Article 87(A) of Military Order 378, may

detain an individual for not longer than six months "if he has
reasonable cause to believe that reasons of the security of the area or
141.

ISRAEL'S MEASURES, supra note

1, at 6.

142. Mara Rudman & Mazen Qupty, The Emergency Powers (Detention)Law: Israel's
Courts Have a Mission-Should They Choose to Accept it?, 21 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L.
REv. 469, 470 (1990). Britain's Defence Regulations were created to govern what would
become Israel and the Territories. Id. at 473.
143. Paust et al., supra note 91, at 54.
144. The order concerns security regulations.
145. Playfair, supra note 85, at 34. "All proposed legislative amendments are
examined by military attorneys to ensure with customary international law, specifically
with Article 43 of the Hague Regulations. Upon enactment, amendments are published
in both Hebrew and Arabic and are subsequently distributed to lawyers, judges, officials,
and, if the legislation affects a significant portion of the population, to the general public."
Reicin, supra note 96, at 531.
146. Playfair, supra note 85, at 34.
147. Id.
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the public security require that [that] person should be held in custody
... ."148 Article 84(A) states: "No military commander may exercise
he believes it to be necessary for definitive
this authority unless
49

security reasons."
One of the most important provisions is the new standard by which
a decision to issue a detention order is based. Rather than the
subjective belief by the area commander that detention is "necessary
and expedient," an objective standard is applied."' The commander
must now have reasonable grounds"' "to believe that for reasons of the
security of the Region or of public security, a person must be held in
detention .

.2".1. Furthermore, under the amended military orders,

148. Id. at 35.
149. Id.
150. Reicin, supra note 96, at 539.
151.
In the case of Gemayel Bathish v. Minister of Defence, the District
Court refused to confirm the Minister's order of administrative
detention on the ground that it had not been made on objective
grounds of public security. Bathish was strongly opposed to the
annexation of the Golan Heights and became a leader of the
opposition to it, but it was not personally involved in violence. The
court held that "obviously, the outlook and nationalistic opinions of
the detainee do not constitute a reason for the imposition of a
administrative detention order."
Playfair, supra note 85, at 36.
152. Reicin, supra note 96, at 539 (citing Security Instructions Order (Judea and
Samaria) No. 815, art. 87 (a) (amend. 18) (5740/1980), 46 K.M. Judea and Samaria
248)).
Various attempts have been made by Israeli officials closely concerned
with issuing administrative detention orders to define the circumstances in
which the orders can be made.
According to Colonel Hadar, a former Military Advocate-General, the
measure is employed only when "no other legal measure exists which could
prevent the detainee's dangerous activity ... (and) the extent of the danger of
the detainee remaining free is so great that the only appropriate measure
against him is administrative detention."
More recently in 1982 the then Israeli Attorney-General, Itzhak Zamir,
issued guidelines concerning the new laws introduced, saying: "Administrative
detention is meant not as a punitive but only as a preventative measure. In
other words, a person may not be administratively detained as a punishment for
an act prejudicial to state security or public security. A punishment for such
an act may only be imposed by a court in ordinary judicial proceedings.
Where there is sufficient good evidence for a conviction in such proceedings,
this will not by itself justify administrative detention."
"Administrative detention is justified only to avert a danger to state
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the area commander is not authorized to delegate his power.' Article
87(c), however, allows a district commander, one who reports to the
area commander, to order a person to be detained if he believes the
Area Commander would have made the same decision." 5 This may
appear to be a matter of semantics, however, there are very real
differences. A detention order issued by a district commander may not
Furthermore, he has no
exceed a period of ninety-six hours.'
6
leave the ultimate
These
differences
authority to renew the order."
responsibility for detention with the area commander.
B. JudicialReview of an Administrative Detention Order
The 1980 amendments to Military Order 378 Section 87 created an
extensive review and appeal procedure for the individuals being
detained.' 57 Under the amended procedure, a detainee must be brought
before a legally qualified military judge within ninety-six hours after
detention." 8 The judge must confirm, cancel, or shorten the length of
detention.' 59 The order must be reviewed" 6 again by a judge not later
But even where such a danger exists,
security or public security.
administrative detention should not be resorted to if more effective and less
severe means of defence against the danger are available, e.g. a criminal action
• . . or a restricting order . .. .
"At the same time, the expression of an opinion, even an extreme opinion
inconsistent with the ordinary concepts of state security or public security, is
not in itself a sufficient ground for administrative detention ..
Playfair, supra note 85, at 35.
153. Playfair, supra note 85, at 35.
154. Id.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Paust et al., supra note 91, at 55.
Id.
Playfair, supra note 85, at 37.
Paust et al., supra note 91, at 55.

159. Id.
160. There is an argument to be made that the review procedure on its face provides
a considerable opportunity for the detainee to challenge the order, but there are features
which render the review in most cases little more than a formality.
The detainee is faced throughout the proceedings by 'security reasons'
behind which he cannot look, and which he is effectively unable to challenge.
Security reasons justify his initial detention; it is security reasons which justify
the refusal to allow him to see the evidence, and which justify also the refusal
to allow him to examine the informant or even to know what the evidence
against him is; it is also security reasons which allow the judge to vary the
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than three months from the original confirmation, even if the duration
of the order itself is for a longer period. 6 ' Additionally, the judge
must review the order every ninety days. 62 If a review does not take
place on a timely basis, the detainee must be released.16 3 The detainee
also has the right to appeal the decision within thirty days to the
president of the relevant military court or to an appointed military
judge." 4 A final appeal can be made
to the Supreme Court of Israel
65
sitting as the High Court of Justice.
Allowing persons in the occupied territories access to Israel's
highest court is an unprecedented legal accomplishment.166 A hearing
before the High Court can result in the cancellation of the detention
order.67 Furthermore, jurisdiction of the High Court over claims
submitted by protected persons exists only because Israel voluntarily
facilitates access to the High Court. 68 There is no provision which
states that the High Court of Justice should entertain claims of nonnationals from causes arising in the administered territories.169 For
example, in Sheikh Suleiman Abu Hilu v. Israel, Justice Witkon held
that the court had jurisdiction over such matters. 70 However, "where
17
the state agreed, the High Court would grant fictitious jurisdiction. "
Justice Witkon believed the court was empowered to hear these cases
rules of evidence, and security reasons allow the detainee's exclusion from the
court. Finally, it is presumably security reasons that dictate the inevitable
secrecy of the session and of the proceedings so that the need for security
cannnot be assessed by others. .

.

. The detainee and his lawyer are thus set

the task of shadow-boxing, arguing against an order while knowing only
rudimentary details of the information which is before the judge and which he
will base his decision.
Playfair, supra note 85, at 42.
161. Paust et al., supra note 91, at 55; Playfair, supra note 85, at 37.
162. Paust et al., supra note 91, at 55.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. "This grant of direct appeal by citizens of the occupied territory to the highest
court of the occupying power provides the first instance of such a right in the history of
military occupation." Reicin, supra note 96, at 532 n.100.
167. Id. at 533.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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only because both parties agreed."72 Justice Sussman agreed with this
analysis when he stated, in Al Jamah v. Minister of Defence, "[it is
General has acquiesced that we
o]nly because the Assistant Attorney
17
take jurisdiction in this case." 3
The High Court of Justice has overturned many military court
judgments in the administered territories and is viewed as a neutral,
objective, judicious body beyond the reach of state politics. 74
Furthermore, the court's decisions are published, and therefore are
subjected to the scrutiny of the international community, which
necessarily serves to safeguard against unfair decisions.'75
VII. NECESSITY IS THE MOTHER OF DETENTION

There would be no need for administrative detention within Israel's
borders if the Arab governments had been willing to live in peace, if they
had not gone to war to block the UN partition resolution of 1948, if they
had not repeatedly waged war, and if they had not continued to terrorize
the Jewish state of Israel.
Scores of Israeli citizens are terrorized by the PLO and other terrorist
organizations through which the PLO has developed links and cooperated
with by providing funds, arms, training, and operational assistance.1 76 The
PLO has been labeled indiscriminate. 7 7 This can be no further from the
truth. In fact, the PLO all too often does discriminate in choosing its
victims.178 These terrorists almost always attack civilians who have no
means to defend themselves. 1 79 Examples include a nursery at a local
kibbutz, a bus load of children, high school youngsters, a Gaza holy man,
172. Id. Professor Yoram Dinstein expresses the minority view that the High Court
of Justice does have jurisdiction. He reasons that because the military government is part

of the State of Israel, it is subject to judicial scrutiny of all its acts, whether or not they
occur in Israel proper. Id. (citing Yoram Dinstein, Judicial Review of Activities of the
Military Authorities in the Administered Territories, 3 TEL Aviv L. REv. 330, 331-32
(1972)).
173. Reicin, supra note 96, at 533.
174. Id. at 534.
175. Id.
176. PLO: The First of Its Kind 3 (Jan. 1989) (unpublished work available at the
Israeli Consulate).
177. Summary of PLO Terrorist Activity Outside of Israel 1 (Apr. 1981) (unpublished
work available at the Israeli Consulate).
178. Id.

179. Id.
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holiday shoppers in a marketplace, and passengers waiting to board a
bus.980
During the 1990s, there has been a general decline in casualties
created by Israeli security forces, whereas killings by Palestinians of other

During the intifada, scores of Palestinians
Palestinians accelerated.'
were slain by other Palestinians who were said to have been suspected of
collaborating with Israeli security forces."8 2 The basis for the suspicion of
The slayings of the "collaborators" were
collaboration was not known.'
1
carried out execution style. 14 "Although some of the victims received
warnings and had some opportunity to plead their cases, it cannot be said
that any of them received a fair hearing before an independent tribunal.
The deprivation of their basic due process rights was all the more serious
in light of the severe punishment meted out."185 It is important to note
that the PLO condones these killings and at the very least failed to
at a time when they had become an almost daily
condemn them
86
occurrence. 1
At the same time, Arafat, in an address to the UN Security Council
session in Geneva, put the blame for the Palestinian problem on the
"defunct illusions of racial superiority and the desire for expansion and
invasion to build the Greater Israel ....

"87

Arafat stated:

[T]he Israeli occupation authorities have been waging
genocide on all fronts and committing against our people crimes
proscribed by international law, by revealed religious law, and
by moral and humanitarian values. Our people are the targets of
a war waged by starvation, by isolating population centres and by
destroying our national economy's infrastructure through
continued land confiscation, theft of water, crop destruction,
heavy taxation-and by attempts to collect those taxes by state
terrorism and theft .

. .

. All this is taking place in accordance
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with a predetermined, racist plan drawn up by the Israeli
government and the fanatic, armed settlers who are facing
'
defenceless citizens in the occupied Palestinian and Arab land. 88
Arafat, the so-called sole representative for the Palestinian people"8 9
claims his "peace initiative," his intifadah, constitutes an example to be
These
followed by persons struggling for freedom and democracy.
words are spoken by a man who denies his own people due process,' a
man who would put ten bullets in the chest of another man who defied the
intifadah,'92 a man who is responsible for the killings of hundreds of
defenseless people, and a man who is responsible for terrorism around the
globe. 93
As former Attorney-General, Itzak Zamir stated that administrative
detention is "an exceptional measure of great severity because of its harsh
impact on the freedom of the person."" He decided to implement the
measure because "the need to defend state and public security" outweighed
"the need to respect the freedom of the individual."195 As previously
discussed, Israel is a country besieged with terrorist activity by persons
within and beyond her borders. Those who find fault with a country
surrounded by her enemies to detain her hostile adversaries who live
within her borders need only refer to American history. One need only
remind himself how America rounded up all people of Japanese ancestry
World War II without any
from the west coast and detained them during
1 96
investigation as to their guilt or innocence.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Arabs claim that the plight of the Palestinians is the heart of the ArabIsraeli conflict, which will not be ended unless the Palestinian question is
solved. The historic truth is that the Palestinian question is the result of
188. Id.
189. Bisharat, supra note 101, at 369-70.

190. Arafat's Address, supra note 82.
191. AN ANNuAL REVIEW, supra note 181, at 473.
supra note 1, at 5.
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193.
194.
195.
196.

Id.
Playfair, supra note 85, at 41.
Id.
See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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the conflict and not the source. The basic cause was the refusal of the
to acknowledge Israel's right to exist as an independent Jewish
Arab states
197
state.
"Both the Israelis and the Palestinians have been living with the hope
that one or the other would disappear. History has borne out neither of
these results. 98 The ongoing attempts at peace talks have constantly
ended with hostility, misunderstanding, and rage. Even now with peace
on the horizon, there are those Arab factions who continue to terrorize the
people of Israel and hold the world hostage with their violent acts.
While Israel is not strictly bound by the traditional international law
of belligerent occupation, it has maintained security measures within the
occupied territories that are fully consonant with the principles of
international law. 1 99 The fourth Geneva Convention authorizes the use of
administrative detention for "imperative reasons of security," and Israel
only applies the measure "for reasons of the security of the area or public
security. 21
Israel's recent amendments to their military orders with respect to
administrative detention have resulted in regulations which limit the
discretion of the military commanders as well as increase the quality of
procedural safeguards. Not only do the military orders give the area
commander less discretion, but the High Court of Justice has actively
ensured that the military does not abuse its discretion.
Sadly, there probably exists rare instances where mistakes are made
and the system is abused. However, just as in our own criminal justice
system, the needs and benefits of a sometimes faulty system outweigh
these rare mistakes and abuses. There is always hope that the current
peace talks will solve the conflict over Israel's choice to apply
administrative detention.
David C. Friedman
197.
198.
199.
200.
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